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The discussion of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law among mainstream legal theorists is 
quite commonplace in Korea. What has Korean legal philosophy gained, and what has it lost 
through its communion with Kelsen? With this question in mind, I will, at least, roughly retrace 
the steps made in modern Korean legal history and consider what kind of impact Kelsen’s theory 
of law has made in several crucial moments. I will reflect upon three moments: the adaptation of 
Kelsen’s Pure theory of Law immediately after the liberation from Japanese occupation, Kelsen’s 
comments on the actions taken by UN Security Council in Korean War, the reference of the 
Korean Prosecution to Kelsen’s Grundnorm and the so-called ‘successful coup’ in the accused 
1995 high treason and murder/attempted murder in the May 18th related case. Furthermore, with 
this background in place, I will venture to discuss each of these questions. First, whether or not 
the Pure Theory of Law has been conducive to the scientizing of jurisprudence in Korea, secondly, 
whether or not it has contributed to constitutional democracy. Thirdly, whether or not it is a 
theory that aids in solving hard cases in the court decisions, fourthly, whether or not it is a theory 
which helps us view law in light of the new changes brought about by globalization, fifthly, 
whether or not it is a theory which corresponds to our experiences and natural practices in 
society. Finally, without regard to whether the answers to these questions are positive or not, we 
will keep these issues in mind and consider how we can overcome or go beyond Kelsen’s theory.
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I. Postulation of the Problem
They say there is such a thing as the ‘postage stamp principle.’ In order 
to make a well-known theory, you need to be able to fit the concept or the 
core of the theory into a size as small as the postage stamp. As the name 
‘The Pure Theory of Law (Reine Rechtslehre)’ tells us, Kelsen’s theory of law, 
which emancipated law from ethics and gave it its own neutral zone away 
from politics, is simple, straightforward and insightful, solving a knotty 
problem readily and is a model example of just what the postage stamp 
principle should entail. However I do think that of all objects of inquiry, 
law is something that should be approached at from all angles. I find it 
difficult to accept a concept of law or theory of law which fits neatly into 
the size of a postage stamp. That, in fact, reminds me of the fable, ‘The 
Blind Men and the Elephant.’ In this fable, some blind men happened to 
come across an elephant. The first blind man who touched its head believed 
it to be a big pot, the man who felt its ears – a fan, the legs – a trunk, the 
long nose – a snake, and its tail – a rope, in this way each one feeling a 
different part, but only one part and so they end up in complete 
disagreement, each man failing to concede the others’ point of view. 
In truth, the discussion over the Pure Theory of Law among mainstream 
legal theorists is quite commonplace in Korea. What has Korean legal 
philosophy gained, and what has it lost through its communion with 
Kelsen? With this question in mind, I will, at least, roughly retrace the steps 
made in modern Korean legal history and consider what kind of impact 
Kelsen’s theory of law has made in several crucial moments. Furthermore, 
with this background in place, I will venture to discuss each of these 
questions. First, whether the Pure Theory of Law has been conducive to the 
scientizing of jurisprudence in Korea, secondly, whether it has contributed 
to constitutional democracy. Thirdly, whether it is a theory that aids in 
solving hard cases in the court decisions, fourthly, whether it is a theory 
which helps us view law in a different perspective in light of the new 
changes brought about by globalization, fifthly, whether it is a theory 
which corresponds to our experiences and natural practices in society. 
Finally, without regard to whether the answers to these questions are 
positive or not, we will keep these issues in mind and consider how we can 
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overcome or go beyond Kelsen’s theory.
As a legal theorist, I do wish to hold Kelsen’s passion in high regard, 
wherein he sought to reveal the science behind jurisprudence, and how it 
stands on its own as a unique area of study. However, the law does not 
exist only as a field of study. One legal scholar who is critical of discussions 
of law solely based on the Pure Theory of Law, argued that discussions 
based on the Pure Theory of Law in Korea is much like the ‘Glass Bead 
Game (Das Glasperlenspiel)’ by Herman Hesse. Far away from secular or 
civil life, the world of an academic professional group making rules with 
glass beads that ordinary people do not understand…
Occasionally the economy is described as a ‘living organism,’ and in a 
sense law too, is a living thing. The law is a living institution, very much 
alive, and living things, as we all know, cannot survive in waters that are 
crystal clean. Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law was too pure in its outer form, 
therefore the confrontation of Kelsen and Korean Legal Philosophy started 
off on the wrong foot in Korean legal history, the history rife with mistakes 
and painful wounds.  
II.  The Confrontation of Kelsen and Korean Legal 
Philosophy  
1. The First Confrontation –Pure Theory of Law or Legal Realism?
Modern history of Korean law, can be seen as broadly encompassing 
about 100 years, starting from the enlightenment period, or in the narrow 
sense, around half a century starting from the emancipation from Japanese 
colonization. During the past half or more century, the Korean legal 
philosophy and professionals met or confronted Kelsen three times.
Immediately after the liberation from Japanese occupation, Korean legal 
philosophy took its baby steps by adopting the Pure Theory of Law by 
Hans Kelsen.1) This was a result of Odaka Domoo (尾高朝雄) who taught 
1) See Un Jong Pak, Hangukbeopcheolhagui Banseonggwa Gwaje [Self-reflection and the Future 
Task of Korean Legal Philosophy], 10 Beopgwa Sahoe [The Law and SocieTy], 189-190 (1994). This 
piece was supplemented and published in my book proBLemS in phiLoSophy of Law (2007).
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legal philosophy at Gyeongseong Imperial University ― the predecessor of 
the present Seoul National University ― following the tradition of 
continental law. As a consequence, teaching legal philosophy scholars who 
succeeded Odaka such as Hang Nyung Lee, San Duk Hwang introduced 
Kelsen-style legal positivism without any evaluation or critical inspection of 
the theory. 
Some scholars believe that the Pure Theory of Law acted as a kind of 
‘godsend’ for people in those times who dreamed of reforms in law and 
rebuilding the law directly after the liberation.2) However, the Pure Theory 
of Law was not a ‘godsend’ of legal philosophy as some thought but in fact 
an unavoidable reality to law scholars of that time, and merely an 
exemplification of this pressing need. In fact Odaka actually changed his 
legal philosophical view after he discovered that citing Kelsen was 
meaningless after the war. 
After emerging from the second World War, Korea was tasked with the 
need to rebuild democracy. The fact that Korea at this stage started off with 
Kelsen was not a result of autonomous enthusiasm for learning or through 
deep introspection, but actually it was a result of the shadows of the old 
times. San Duk Hwang, who translated and published the Pure Theory of 
Law and wrote in the preface, “In terms of our independent efforts to 
establish the law in our nation, considering the fact that Japanese legal 
scholars sought to put our country under Kelsen’s influence rather than any 
other Western country, I simply place our starting point in overcoming 
Kelsen’s theory.”3) However, afterwards San Duk Hwang failed in 
contributing any other theoretical building block or practical discourse for 
overcoming Kelsen, and as a result abetted law education and legal circles 
in being overrun by Kelsen’s theory. 
In truth if there was a need to pay heed to Kelsen in order to dispose of 
the abuse of law and for the reconstruction of constitutional democracy, it 
was necessary to critically assess Kelsen’s work on the essence and value of 
democracy alongside his theory of pure law. Instead there was exclusive 
devotion to his pure theory of law alone. However it was only in the 1960s 
2) Id. at 66.
3) hanS KeLSen, SunSuBeopaK [The pure Theory of Law], at i (San Duck Hwang trans., 
1949).
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and 1970s that Kelsen’s work on democracy was taken notice of, and only a 
little. In this way the “pure theory of law” planted its roots deeply in law 
school education as mainstream legal theory. In making this possible 
scientism which was advocated by the pure theory of law probably played 
a large role. At any rate the pure theory of law discussion has so far been 
the most appealing to Korean legal scholars, legal practitioners, and others 
studying law more than any other theory. 
In facing the task of disposing of laws established by Japanese colonial 
rule and reconstruction of the rule of law after the liberation, legal 
philosophy should not have focused on Kelsen’s pure theory of law but 
rather on the restoration of morality of law, on discovering the gap between 
rule and reality and how to bridge this gap, among other things, and in fact 
a line of thinking very unlike the pure theory of law should have been 
requested. In truth there was some movement that advocated a shift away 
from legal. This movement did not spring from legal theorists but from 
those who were practicing law. 
If legal scholars lead the general atmosphere of legal positivism, legal 
philosophy of the judicial officers emphasized ‘living law’ as opposed to 
‘law in the books’ and sought to find a road that went beyond legal 
positivism. In the face of the great gap between a hastily established law4) 
and the reality at hand, and in order to overcome this they tried to find 
ways to actively and formatively interpret the law. Furthermore they did 
not see the law and pol i t ics separate ly , and on the bas is of 
acknowledgement of the connection between the two they understood the 
special function that the judicature played, and feared the destruction of the 
law by political power. It was in this atmosphere which sought to rescue 
legal decisions according to the ‘living law,’ that Ehrlich’s Fundamental 
Principles of the Sociology of Law and other books on sociological legal theory 
4) At the time, one side argued for the rapid compilation of a new statute law, and the 
other side said that there were serious problems with such rough-and-ready legislation and 
argued for the continued use of custom law for the time being, but in the end the direction 
was laid in opting for a rapid establishment of new statutes. Because the establishment of 
basic law was too hurried, for the reasons that Japanese legislative system was the modern 
legal system, the Japanese law system was adopted and translated into Korea’s new 
legislative system. Criminal law, civil law and other major laws were established during the 
Korean War of June 25th 1950 in refuge. 
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begun to be translated. However this request from legal realism was 
neglected by educational circles. Therefore the issues involving the reality 
of society, wherein the basic assumptions of legal judgment are, were 
ousted from Korean law textbooks. In this way the scope of law as a field of 
study was limited to a normative approach, and a climate that tended to 
focus on literal interpretation of the existing law and statutes was created. 
2. The Second Confrontation – The Korean War and the UN Law
In his book published in 1951, Recent Trends in the Law of the United 
Nations5) Kelsen wrote in detail about the international problems related to 
the actions taken by the UN in the Korean War in 1950. At the time the UN 
Security Council passed three Resolutions (June 25, 1950; June 27, 1950; July 
7, 1950). It is difficult to go into the content of these Resolutions in detail so 
here we will look at the Resolutions in brief.
In the first Resolution the UN Security Council, on the armed attack by 
the North Korean army stated that “this kind of activity fosters the 
destruction of peace” and resolved that the army retreat to the 38 parallel as 
a provisional measure. Kelsen firstly pointed out that it was problematic 
that the Resolution of the UN Security Council, considering that North 
Korea was a rebel organization that was not formally recognized by the 
UN, was addressed at the Authorities of North Korea and not at a state. 
More than anything else, ‘international peace’ in the UN Charter in 
principle means ‘peace among states’ and therefore the ‘destruction of 
peace’ as outlined in the UN Charter, in principle, was not relevant to the 
North Korean army’s forceful act of attack as it was not an armed attack 
among states. 
The second Resolution stated that “it recommends that the UN Member 
States provide necessary help to Korea in order to restore international 
peace and safety,” and it included the use of armed force. Kelsen 
questioned whether the ‘recommendation’ under the Charter could include 
armed action. If there was a need for forceful measures, it could not be 
made in the fashion of a recommendation to the U.S., a Member State, the 
5) hanS KeLSen, recenT TrendS in The Law of The uniTed naTionS (1951)
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only way such an action could be made was by UN Security Council itself. 
According to Kelsen such measures could be legitimate only in the case that 
the UN Security Council recognized the Korean War as an international 
war among different states, however this did not appear in the Resolution 
adopted by the UN Security Council. 
In the end according to Kelsen Korea’s armed dispute which can be seen 
as a civil war, forceful measures, according to Article 39 of the Charter, can 
only be enacted in the case of ‘threat’ not ‘destruction’ of international 
peace, and therefore not in the ‘restoration’ of peace but only in 
‘maintenance’ of peace. Therefore the UN Security Council formally saw 
the armed conflict in the Korean peninsula as civil war, however in reality it 
thought of it as an international war between two states and made a series 
of measures. Accordingly Kelsen had pointed out these problems 
pertaining to international law. 
The third Resolution recommended that the ‘Joint Forces Command’ 
“use all forces and other assistance.” Kelsen asserted that the third 
Resolution passively legalized U.S. action, and criticized that collective self-
defense was invocated after safety maintenance measures had already been 
taken and therefore in principle was not able to be taken under UN laws. 
Furthermore it was difficult to assume that action taken by a Member State 
as being UN action, and also action taken under mere recommendations 
cannot be the Action by UN and is therefore problematic.
3.  The Third Confrontation – ‘Grundnorm’ and the ‘Successful Coup 
d’état’
In 1995 the Korean Prosecution referred to Kelsen’s Grundnorm in the 
accused high treason and murder/attempted murder in the May 18th 
related case. Following the legal principles of the so-called ‘successful 
coup,’ two former presidents including those responsible for the May 18th 
Gwangju civil massacre were not prosecuted, the Prosecution holding up 
Kelsen’s Grundnorm as their brazen shield. At the time the Prosecution cited 
legal philosophers such as Kelsen, Jellinek, Radbruch, and in accordance 
with the legal principles of the so-called ‘successful coup,’ stated that in the 
case that a new leading power at the front of major political change has 
been successful in creating a new government, they cannot be charged (in 
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defense of the former government) for rebellion against the former political 
order, and accordingly the successive actions cannot be the object of judicial 
review. That is, the Prosecution cited Kelsen’s Grundnorm and asserted that 
“if political reform has been successful and the new order becomes the 
effective new order, this becomes a change in fundamental norm which 
follows the recognition of the new government as the authority for 
establishment of the law.”6)
It is common knowledge that Kelsen tried to understand all legal 
matters from a normative standpoint, that is, ‘norm from norm.’ Because 
this standpoint is hypothetical and logical, fundamental norm can be 
completely free form the reality of law legislation and the content of law. 
Kelsen asserts that in this way, free from ethical, political, social methods, 
purely normative legal positivism, that is, pure legal theory can be 
established. 
Kelsen, who claims that the principle of ‘legality’ is limited by the 
principle of ‘effectiveness,’ included coup d’etat or rebellions in the scope of 
revolution which limits legality. Success of resistance from the ‘grassroots’ 
masses and revolution which has its core aim in reform of ideology can be 
justified by the theory of general recognition or by the idea of the law. 
However the same rule, I think, cannot be applied to coups and rebellions. 
However Kelsen’s amoral attitude disregards this point and only defines 
according to whether it is successful or not. 
The Korean Prosecution could have been confused about the so called 
‘points of view.’ That is to say, as legal practitioners the Prosecution should 
have recognized the law as being binding and should have taken an 
‘participant standpoint,’ instead they unduly took an ‘observer standpoint’ 
same as the standpoint a theorist such as Kelsen takes when explaining the 
law as having a value free and scientific bearing.7)
In truth as Kelsen himself said, “Pure theory of law does not stipulate to 
6) See un Jong paK & in Sup han, may 18Th: LegaL reSponSiBiLiTieS and hiSToricaL 
reSponSiBiLiTieS (1995). On ‘actual normative power’ citing Jellinek, and for the section citing 
Radbruch see Hun Sup Shim, Beopcheolhak. Hyeongmyeong. Kudeta: Geomcharui 5.18 
Bulgisocheobuneul Gyegiro [Legal Philosophy ion citing ciCoup d’état: From the Non-indictment of the 
May 18 Cases by the Prosecutor’s Office ], may 18Th: LegaL reSponSiBiLiTieS and hiSToricaL 
reSponSiBiLiTieS, 40 (1995) 
7) To read in more detail on this assertion see id. at 60.
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obey the commands of the constitutional legislator.” According to Kelsen 
the duty to obey the law cannot be answered by academic theory but it is 
dependent on the decision made in accordance to our conscience. However 
how can one say that obedience of law is dependent on the freedom of 
those subject to law in one hand, and in the other hand assert that the 
underlying hypothesis of Grundnorm is that ‘objective binding force’ lies in 
the same law? It is incomprehensible.
The decision by the came to head against a pan-national resistance. 
Bowing to the pressure from the masses, the Prosecution later on changed 
its legal standpoint 180 degrees, and a special law for the May 18th 
movement was legislated, which was finally legally settled.
III. What Kelsen left
1.  How did the Pure Theory of Law Contribute to Scientization of 
Jurisprudence?
Kelsen’s lifelong work was to place jurisprudence, in the same level as 
science. That is, as a field of study, reveal that the law stands separate in its 
own entity and accordingly demonstrate the innateness of law. Kelsen’s 
interest in scientization was insofar as that he aimed to write on law to the 
heights of natural science, and some point out that the concept of 
Grundnorm could have risen from the hypothesis method used in building a 
theory in natural science. According to Kelsen the core of law as a field of 
study is to purely understand the law as a norm based on what it ought to 
be, and establish normative theory on this. Here oughtness, that is, norm 
refers to the actions which humans ‘ought to’ perform according to a 
certain method, and this statement is essentially different from the 
statement that predicates the fact of existence.8) 
We can acknowledge the enlightening, pragmatic significance of the 
dualistic method. At the very least the existence of a norm that is distinct 
from reality can be illuminated in introduction to law. It can be useful in 
8) hanS KeLSen, reine rechTSLehre [pure Theory of Law], 4 (1976) (German)
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that it also reveals the structure of working legal regulations and therefore 
allows for better understanding of the structure of the working law. In 
reflecting on my own past in teaching law to students, the Pure Theory of 
Law appeals most to those studying law because of these advantages. 
Till the 1970s in China Kelsen’s legal theory was usually subject to 
criticism from the Marxist viewpoint, but in 1990 after the “rule of law 
(依法治國)” was established in the Constitution, there was increasing 
awareness for the need to set up a legal system, and resolve legal problems 
within legal structure and due process away from political influence or 
dependence on parties, and accordingly this lead to interest in Kelsen 
among legalists.
Kelsen describes law as the existing forcible order, that is, “law in itself” 
and therefore refers to positive law. Kelsen contended that his Pure Theory 
of Law, in the sense that it does not ask whether positive law is “ideal” or 
“justifiable” and therefore has an “anti-ideological tendency,” and from the 
fact that it also asks whether it is a “realistic,” “possible” law it is a “realistic 
legal theory.” This unique ‘realistic’ theory devised an extreme artificial 
structure that is Grundnorm in order to answer to the scientization of law 
as a field of study, and the issue of legitimacy was excluded from norms, 
which is understood as a delegation of power from this Grundnorm. Here 
is where the core of Kelsen-style scientization comes in.
The request for law to be placed in a separate entity, regarded as being 
equal to the request for the scientization of law, is closely related to the 
request for law to have a formal character. To want the law to have a formal 
character means, in other words, for the law not to be subordinate or 
included in the structure which is different from, in other words, outside 
the law. Also, the emphasis on the formal structure that law should have is 
also a precaution against the dangers of partisanship. In other words, it is 
assuming the dogma of a complete legal order, so plainly put that in the 
implementation of law the meaning or interpretation is unnecessary as the 
law is self-explanatory. However a supposition of law of which its 
interpretation is obvious, or where there is no need for interpretation, is 
becoming more and more unrealistic. Even in history, we can see that the 
area of law where interpretation is obvious due to its formality has 
continued to be reduced. Today judicial officers must consider customary 
practice, public sentiments and other factors, and in short it has become 
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increasingly difficult to decide a case to be null and void due to the fact that 
it does not concur with the formal law. The spirit of the times has changed 
in a direction that pursues the discovery of ‘substantive truth.’ 
In conclusion the law does not have its own window for looking out 
into the world. But it would be an overstatement to assert that the law, in its 
discourse and methodology, does not have its own intrinsic character. 
What I believe is that it is impossible to completely rule out discretion or 
the factor of subjectivity in legal decisions. Therefore in order to prevent 
this discretion or subjectivity turning into an arbitrary decision, it is 
important to include a process of reviewing via content or by method. 
There is danger, however, in this process, legal decisions may be thought of 
as an epigone of moral judgment or an ideological dispute. But in one 
society the function of law as an institution is distinctively separate from 
morals or politics. If we fail to address the problems of purpose and 
direction of law and continue to simply maintain the order created by 
statutes, the study of law will indeed merely be a technique learnt for 
earning money and there will not be any point in earning a degree in law at 
law school. 
2.  Whether the Pure Theory of Law Contributed to the Realization of 
Constitutional Democracy
According to Kelsen the concept of ‘the rule of law’ does not seek to 
secure freedom, rather it seeks to ensure the predictable execution of the 
law in administration and judiciary. “The effect of the rule of law lies in the 
rationalization of the government’s activity. That is, the most important 
thing is the institution and application procedure of the law. What it aims 
for is not freedom but safety.”9) Kelsen’s state under ‘the rule of law’ does 
not refer to a specific type of state order but all state action taken under an 
established law order. That is the concept of the state under ‘the rule of law’ 
is that all states need to legislate a state order that compels human action, 
and this enforceable action, whether it is autocratic, democratic and 
whatever its content may be, must be a legal order. If the execution of the 
9) Kelsen, supra at. 314. 
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law is the core of the state under the rule of law, democracy can be easily 
toppled under the name of ‘the rule of law.’ 
Kelsen believed that by protecting the separate identity of law we can 
place democracy on a higher level. His norm-centered ideas are reflected in 
his theory on democracy as well. He asserted that political freedom, general 
will, peoples’ sovereignty and other democratic ideas cannot be realized in 
the real world because of division among the people of a nation, the need to 
maintain order, etc. In other words these concepts are bound to undergo a 
transformation in meaning whilst staying as close as possible to the original 
democratic ideas. Therefore, for example, the original idea of unanimity as 
the original contract for establishing a legal order must undergo a change in 
meaning. The meaning of unanimity is justified by allowing for the barest 
minimum of people having a contradictory opinion against the state’s will, 
while the greater majority of the people’s interest must coincide with the 
will of the state.10)
Similarly, Kelsen also talks about the transformation of the concept of 
freedom. That is, as each individual human being refuses to be dominated 
by another’s rule, they end up emphasizing the freedom they can enjoy 
within a state, that is, ‘freedom as a social group,’ rather than the freedom 
they can have as an isolated individual. In this way the freedom of the 
individual transforms into a concept that request for the ‘freedom of the 
state.’11)
Consequently the transformation of the meaning of freedom which is 
required to prevent the freedom of the individual turning into anarchical 
freedom is made in order to introduce some form of norm. That is, Kelsen, 
in order to emphasis order, conceptualizes the meaning of freedom into a 
normative form. Additionally, he contends that we can only argue about 
freedom solely in the normative sense. So under Kelsen, ‘national unity’ 
which symbolizes the general will transforms into “the unity of a legal 
order of the state which regulates the actions of the people who abide by 
norms.”12)
10) Kelsen, Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie [The Nature and Value of Democracy], 
ScienTia VerLag aaLen, 8 (2d ed. 1981)
11) Id. at 11-13.
12) Id. at 15.
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According to this ‘norm realistic approach’ by Kelsen, democracy is but 
a mode or method for the formation of national will, and is unrelated to 
any kind of approach which supports a substantive principle.13) Kelsen 
maintains that the moment democracy is understood as a substantive 
principle and not a modal principle, totalitarianism in the name of 
democracy will appear. In other words democracy should be understood 
only as an apparatus for change of government ‘by the people’; to go 
further and understand democracy being ‘for the people’ can be 
dangerous.14) Hence the right of political decision is summed up as the right 
to vote. 
Kelsen’s approach in severing legal concept from the political ideals of 
democracy was an attempt to overcome the unclear inconsistency of the 
mixture of law and politics we found ourselves in. As history demonstrates, 
the law did not develop separately under its own form of logical reasoning 
by surpassing or by going against politics, but rather it was very much 
connected to political actions in that it had its struggles against problems 
such as the use of power by the existing authority, and the prejudice of the 
legal authorities. In short the law is not a servant of politics, nor does it 
surpass politics. To assert that the law is nothing but a product of power 
play is to go against the complications of the legal experience. The appeal 
the law has to justice cannot be ignored when we understand the fact that 
citizens follow and abide by the law. The normative aspect of law does not 
merely refer to what the law should be, i.e. a command which asserts that 
something ‘shall be’ done, but it is something that appeals to an ideal, and 
it is something that cannot be detached from our legal experience. Not only 
is this, but the appeal to legal values is innately connected to that which is 
sought after in politics. This is why even the aggressor always takes on the 
pretence of saying that the law is an appeal for justice. 
The law functions in a way to structure and assess the methods by 
which political authority is practiced. On this point we should heed the 
13) Id. at 98.
14) Kelsen contends that if you understand the principle of democracy not just as ‘by the 
people’ but also ‘for the people,’ ideology and value-laden judgment is incorporated, and the 
distortion of democracy ― for example that authoritarianism is also for the good of democracy 
― occurs.  Kelsen, Foundations of Democracy, eThicS 1, 1 (1955).
318 |   Journal of Korean Law Vol. 10: 305
opinion that the legal discourse has its roots in political practice.15) When we 
think about the ‘judicialization of politics’ that is happening in today’s 
world, I am inclined to take note of the following opinion rather than 
Kelsen’s opinion: The law is another form of political discourse, the only 
difference being that because of the special role and responsibilities of the 
judicature, it is a political discourse having a special function. 
3. Whether the Pure Theory of Law Aids in Solving Hard Cases
As one Roman legal scholar once said, at any rate the law doesn’t really 
apply to rare cases but it applies to everyday cases that happen often in 
everyday life (Celsus D1.3.5). However an increasingly large number of 
hard cases are arising where in one case among more than two legal 
practitioners differ in opinion. What does Kelsen’s theory on law suggest to 
us on this issue? As a general rule, legal philosophy or legal theory does not 
really help us directly solve cases. Even so, theories that help legal 
practitioners who have to make decisions look at things from a larger 
perspective can sometimes be sought after for reference in certain 
situations. Radbruch’s “Unrecht argument” or Dworkin’s “principle 
argument” are good examples of this. Academically the study of law is 
ultimately one of learning how to make decisions. Without the assumption 
that there is a better or a worse decision, it would be axiomatically incorrect 
to make a choice at all. 
From Kelsen’s positive law point of view there is no objective standard 
for justification of one interpretation over another. However among legal 
practitioners it is worthwhile in asking which one is the better path when 
legal opinions clash. Also, on this point the practice of law is not complete 
with just formal reasoning. Legal reasoning does not only include 
conceptual analysis but unification and association of intelligence, 
presentation of the evidence, demonstration of proof through discourse, 
inter-subjective validity, possibility of mutual agreement, etc, and by 
including all these things it finally displays its practical reasoning ability on 
the cognitive front. 
15) marTin LoughLin, Sword and ScaLeS. an examinaTion of The reLaTionShip BeTween Law 
and poLiTicS, (2000).
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4.  What does the Pure Theory of Law offer in terms of Globalization of 
Law?
So far I have discussed Kelsen’s theoretical structure, although it has not 
been judged on moral grounds, in that it is useful in our recognition of 
what the structure of positive law looks like. Kelsen, while purifying formal 
law from all non-legal areas, in order to understand all laws from one 
perspective, introduces the hierarchical structure theory. This theory which 
is usually introduced as a pyramid model of the stages of law has almost 
become a symbol of law itself. I myself as a student, remember listening to 
my professor’s lecture, and being impressed as I watched him draw a 
pyramid with rules and regulations on the bottom, above it ordinances and 
enactments, and finally on top the constitution. The pyramid model allows 
one to understand the law, and helps convey the message that the world of 
law is one that is orderly, comprehensive and at the same time scientific. 
More than anything else, as Kelsen admitted himself, it demonstrates that 
the law regulates its own creation. Kelsen’s hierarchical structure theory 
which foments confidence in the self-sufficiency structure, alongside 
syllogism, helps put an illuminating halo around law to make it seem more 
scientific. 
However in the stream of globalization, the hierarchical structure theory 
of law has its limitations in explaining the conflict in the vast domain 
among national law, regional law, international law and supranational 
law.16) Perhaps it may be more appropriate to no longer use the ‘pyramid’ 
model but to describe the current predicament with the ‘network’ model.17) 
In short the law is only partly explained by the pyramid model. When we 
consider overlapping or pluralizing of legal order and the difficulties 
involved in setting boundaries of governance, the boundaries in the 
pyramid model also become ambiguous. 
16) On this refer to my thesis Kelsenis Pure Theory of Law from the Perspective of 
Globalization, 9 JournaL of Korean Law, 146, 146 (Dec. 2009) 
17) Mario G. Losano, Turbulenzen im Rechtssystem der Modernen Gesellschaft - Pyramide, 
Stufenbau und Netzwerkcharakter der Rechtsordnung als ordnungsstiftende Modelle [Turbulence in 
the Legal System of Modern Society - Pyramidal, hierarchical structure and network character of the 
legal system as a regulatory-creating models], 38 rechTSTheorie, 14-30 (2007) (German)
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Kelsen’s theory on the hierarchical levels of law is a result of legislative 
positivism. Fundamentally, it springs from the idea of a legislative state and 
it is a positivism model appropriate for the state law structure. However, 
today we have departed from state-centrism and with the strong wind of 
globalization, the state law is placed under pressures and exposed to new 
environments where overlapping with local laws, international laws, trans/
supra-state laws are inevitable. The pyramid model cannot but face 
limitations in explaining such new predicaments.
5.  Does Kelsen’s Theory Concur with our Experience and Natural 
Practice?
Kelsen’s theory springs from neo-Kantian’s dualistic methodology. At 
the same time it limits the object of the study of law to normative law. In 
Korean academic legal circles, the dualistic method is used as the standard 
methodology. However I believe that Kelsen-style explanation on ‘what is’ 
and ‘what ought to be,’ does not suit our experience or the natural practice 
of law. Furthermore I believe that the task of legal theory and the field of 
academic law are to find a theory which better conforms to our experiences 
in society and natural practice of law. 
Kelsen, who strictly differentiates between norms and the real world, 
adheres to the standpoint that observance of norms, and problems arising 
from the implementation of law are merely problems of fact, problems of 
existence and are not objects of the study of law. However the institution of 
law has always given and taken from history and has continued to be 
influenced by it. Also like other fields of study, it has always sought after 
the ideal of objectivity and at the same time seeking the spirit of the times. 
One scholar’s passionate bid for objective science, in the next chapter of 
history, was revealed to be objectivity sought after as compensation for the 
instability of that era. 
Unlike Kelsen even if we accept the non-positivist concept of law, the 
law cannot be just deduced from the idea of law, nor can judicial decisions 
be simply deduced from the law. In order for deduction to be successful, 
inclusion of factors from the real world is indispensible. Also for the 
induction of judicial decisions to be successful, a value-laden perspective 
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must be included.18)
It has already been pointed out by many scholars that judgment of 
practical reason does not signify that we simply ‘apply’ certain rules or 
principles that we have to individual cases. Very early on Aristotle objected 
to the idea that moral judgment is the application of a general principle to a 
particular situation. In explaining the ethics behind Aristotle Hans-Georg 
Gadamer asserted that we do not start off in possession of moral 
knowledge that we can just apply, but rather through our efforts we end up 
creating moral knowledge.19) It may be that Aristotle’s moral theory is more 
compatible with the natural implementation of our experiences.20) Recently 
in cognitive/neural science there have been attempts to defend Aristotle’s 
moral theory. I myself do not agree with the inclination of explaining 
normative theory as a continuum of science. But at the very least, these 
attempts show us that Kelsen’s explanation of the relationship between 
norm and reality does not really fall into place with our experiences. 
In some aspects, norm exists in all areas of everyday life. Cass R. 
Sunsetin realized this while explaining the position of norm in social 
activities. For example minor exemplary activities ― taking out the trash, 
going out on a date, singing, expressing anger, talking … ― it affects these 
social activities. Sunstein understood such minute moral activities as being 
norms.21)
IV. Going Beyond Kelsen
Kelsen asserted that his normative inquiry of the formal existence of law 
as what ought to be is separate from the inquiry of the social sciences in 
explaining existence, yet he left an alibi by stating that he does not overlook 
the relationship between the effective legal order and the existence of a 
18) Supra., p. 323.
19) Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode [Truth and Method] , 3 Aufl., J. C. B. 
MOHR, 300 (1972) (German).
20) Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and 
everything, Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B, 359 (2004), available at PubMed.
21) Cass R. Sunstein, Norms and Roles, in The program for The STudy of Law, phiLoSophy & 
SociaL Theory (Ronald Dworkin ed., 1995).
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corresponding society. In reality he did not truly disregard the phenomena 
of law. That is, he really only excluded regulations of positive law that were 
wholly ineffective in his inquiry, he considered the realistic power relations 
between the two groups, and carefully inspected the volition of the 
legislator as well. What does all this mean? Could it be that even the study 
of law, which purported to be a science, was standing on the empirical 
social dimensions that Kelsen refused to allow into his theory of law? 
Paradoxically it leads one to believe that Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law can 
only become a sound and intact legal theory by incorporating those areas 
that Kelsen sought to drive out so completely.
The law has played a pivotal role in creating the overall concept and 
frame of society, politics, economy, and culture like the one we have today. 
The law that binds us today was developed from modern Western law 
since the inception of the modern state, and modern law alongside modern 
science have been the two pillars of driving force that has rationalized, 
systematized, institutionalized, and stabilized our lives. On this point as 
science and technology is in today’s world, the law is linked to our society, 
politics, economy, and culture as a whole much like the way light and dark 
are irrevocably linked. 
Since of modern age, legal knowledge, through integration with the 
rationality of science ― like the words ‘knowledge is power’ from Francis 
Bacon ― continues to maximize its utility and became a mode of social 
control and social development. 
The strategy of positivism is to separate legal knowledge from social 
power. Instead of ascertaining the autonomy, universality, and generality 
of law, the theoretical conditions of legal knowledge is its subordination in 
the interests of the state. On this point we can say that scientific positivism 
undermined the ‘emancipatory factor’ that modern law, whilst aiming for 
freedom and equality, held onto.22)
This is a moment for social change as well as a turning point for our 
awareness. It is also a chance for us to see clearly the bright sides and 
shadows of our legislative system. This is precisely why we must look upon 
22) On this refer to the work by Latin American progressive social philosopher 
BoaVenTura de SouSa SanToS, Toward a new LegaL common SenSe, 5, 62 (2d ed., Butterworths, 
2002) 
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the law from a higher perspective. By looking at the law from a higher 
standpoint, we can ultimately understand that the formality and content of 
our regulations and institutions are not something that has been given to us 
out of some sort of necessity and inevitability. 
How is the law related to a good social order? Under the world finance 
and capitalism, when people studying economics and business management 
produced unbelievable financial derivatives through pedantic mathematical 
models in Wall Street, legal practitioners followed suit by interpreting 
de-regulation related laws, finance modernization laws and other liberalist 
legislations in a favorable manner for businesses and the market. In order 
to stop disappointment and lamentation toward mainstream economists 
and economic experts ― who were bent on nothing else but reaching market 
goals ― being transferred to mainstream legal scholars and legal experts 
who are used to the Kelsen-style argumentation, we must extricate ourselves 
from the occult slogan ‘norm from norm.’ The theory of law must once 
again reconcile itself to find a way to merge soundly with empirical research. 
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